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Below we display the major publications from our researchers.


Björnsson, Gunnar. (forthcoming) "Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility", forthcoming in Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland (eds.) Responsibility - the Epistemic Condition (New York: Oxford University Press).

Björnsson, Gunnar and Brülde, Bengt. (forthcoming) "Normative Responsibilities: Structure and Sources", forthcoming in Kristien Hens, Dorothee Horstkötter and Daniela Cutas (eds.) Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics (Dordrecht: Springer).

Hartman, Robert J. (Forthcoming) The Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck, co-edited with Ian M. Church (New York: Routledge).

Hartman, Robert J. (Forthcoming) “Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism,” Journal of Philosophical Research, DOI: 10.5840/jpr2017426102

Hartman, Robert J. (forthcoming) "Accepting Moral Luck," in Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck (New York: Routledge).

Hartman, Robert J. (forthcoming) "Review of Rik Peels' Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology" Ethics.

Matheson, Benjamin. (forthcoming) "The Threat From Manipulation Arguments", American Philosophical Quarterly

Milam, Per-Erik. (forthcoming) "How Is Self-Forgiveness Possible?", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Russell, Paul. (forthcoming) "The Limits of Free Will: Selected Papers" (Oxford University Press: forthcoming 2016).

Russell, Paul. (forthcoming) "Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich's Third Way", in Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. G. Caruso, ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (forthcoming 2017).


Hartman, Robert J. (2017) In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory (New York: Routledge)

Russell, Paul. (2017) "Free Will and Moral Sense: Strawsonian Approaches", in Meghan Griffith, Neal Levy, Kevin Timpe, eds. Routledge Companion to Free Will. Pp. 96-108.

Russell, Paul. (2017) "Free Will Pessimism". In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 4, edited by David Shoemaker. Oxford University Press. Pp. 93-120.

Russell, Paul. (2017) Review of "Conversation and Responsibility" by Michael McKenna. Philosophical Review, 126.2, Pp. 285-95.


Björnsson, Gunnar and Hess, Kendy. (2016) "Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research pp. n/a-n/a

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2016) "Outsourcing the Deep Self: Deep Self Discordance Does Not Explain Away Intuitions in Manipulation Arguments" Philosophical Psychology. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1150448

Björnsson, Gunnar and Pereboom, Derk. (2016) "Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility", in Justin Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter (eds.) Companion to Experimental Philosophy (Chichester: Blackwell). pp. 142-157.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016) "Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do otherwise", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(5): pp. 1225-1240

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016) "Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism", Philosophia vol. 44. Issue 3. pp. 793-808

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016) "Accountability, Answerability and Freedom", Social Theory and Practice 42(4): pp.681-705

Matheson, Benjamin. (2016) "In Defence of the Four-Case Argument", Philosophical Studies 173 (7): pp. 1963-1982

Milam, Per-Erik. (2016) "Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46.1: pp. 102-122

Russell, Paul. (2016) "Free Will and Moral Sentiments: Strawsonian Theories" in The Routledge Companion to Free Will. M. Griffith, N. Levy and K. Timpe (eds.), (New York: Routledge: 2016), pp. 96-108.


Russell, Paul. (2015) - "’Hume’s Lengthy Digression’: Free Will in the Treatise", invited contribution to Hume’s Treatise: A Critical Guide, A. Butler & D. Ainslie, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2015), 230-51.

Szigeti, András. (2015) "Review of Michael Bratman's Shared Agency", Journal of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18: pp. 1101-1104.

Szigeti, András. (2015) "Is Collective Mental Action Possible?", Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6: pp. 843-864.

Szigeti, András. (2015) "Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas", Dialectica 69: pp. 1-22.


Björnsson, Gunnar and McPherson, Tristram. (2014) "Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the specification problem", Mind, 124: 1–38.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2014) "Incompatibilism and ‘Bypassed’ Agency", in Al Mele (ed.) Surrounding Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press) pp. 95–122.

Björnsson, Gunnar and Pereboom, Derk. (2014) "Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing", Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility (MIT Press) pp. 27–35.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2014) "Essentially Shared Obligations", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 38 Forward-Looking Collective Moral Responsibility, pp. 103–120.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2014) "Responsibility problems for criminal justice", Frontiers of Psychology 5: 821.

Matheson, Benjamin. (2014) "Compatibilism and Personal Identity", Philosophical Studies, 170, 2: pp. 317-334

Szigeti, András. (2014) "Focusing Forgiveness as an Emotion", Journal of Value Inquiry 48: pp. 217-234.

Szigeti, András. (2014) "Collective Responsibility and Group-Control", In The Individualism/Holism Debate: An Anthology, edited by Julie Zahle et al. Heidelberg: Springer: pp. 97-116.


Björnsson, Gunnar and Persson, Karl. (2013) "A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87: 611-39.

Russell, Paul. (2013) "Responsibility, Naturalism and ‘the Morality System’". Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, David Shoemaker, ed. (Oxford University Press: 2013), 184-204.

Russell, Paul. (2013) "The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates". Edited with Oisin Deery (Oxford University Press: 2013).

Szigeti, András. (2013) "Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?" In Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Contributions to Social Ontology, edited by Anita Konzelmann-Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid. Berlin: Springer: pp. 329-342.

Szigeti, András. (2013) "Emotions and Heuristics", Journal of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16: pp. 845-862.

Szigeti, András. (2013) "Verantwortung ohne Strafe: Was macht Verantwortungszuschreibungen moralisch verbindlich?" In Moral und Sanktion, edited by Eva Buddeberg and Achim Vesper. Frankfurt/New York: Campus: pp. 291-316 (in German).


Björnsson, Gunnar and Persson, Karl. (2012) "The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility", Noûs 46:2 (2012), pp. 326–354.

Szigeti, András. (2012) "Revisiting Strawsonian Arguments from Inescapability", Philosophica 85: pp. 91-121.


Page Manager: Andreas Ott|Last update: 10/21/2017

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