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GRP Reading Group Meeting

Seminarium

Reading group meeting arranged by researchers at the Gothenburg Responsibility Project.

Researchers at the Gothenburg Responsibility Project have formed a reading group together with associated philosophers and students where they discuss books and articles on relevant topics for their research. The group meets every two weeks.

This week's presentation is: Robert Hartman (University of Gothenburg) - "Indirectly Free Acts, Libertarianism, and Moral Luck".

Abstract:
Martin Luther refuses to recant his theological position by saying "Here I stand. I can do no other." Supposing that Luther's claim is true, he lacks freedom to do otherwise at the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians think that Luther is praiseworthy for that action, since Luther is praiseworthy for earlier free actions that made him into the kind of person who could not recant. This paper explores the moral and metaphysical contours of volitional necessities like Luther's. First, I explain what volitional necessities are. Second, I argue that for Luther to be additionally praiseworthy for his volitionally necessitated action, then we should agree that the results of a person's free actions can partially determine her positive praiseworthiness or blameworthiness - that is, we should agree that resultant moral luck exists. After all, if Luther isn't praiseworthy for the results of his earlier free actions, then he isn't praiseworthy for being the kind of person who stands his ground in that circumstance, and there can be no accountability transfer to what he does. Third, I examine the kind of metaphysical contribution that an agent must make via earlier character-forming free actions to be morally accountable for a volitionally necessitated action. Or, I consider how much constitutive moral luck a volitionally necessitated action for which one is morally accountable can tolerate. Fourth, I assess the kind of epistemic connection the agent must have between her character-forming free actions to be morally accountable for her volitionally necessitated action.

Datum: 2017-06-12

Tid: 13:30 - 15:00

Kategorier: Humaniora, Forskning

Arrangör: Gothenburg Responsibility Project

Plats: Olof Wijksgatan 6 Room T340

Kontaktperson: Per-Erik Milam

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Sidansvarig: Andreas Ott|Sidan uppdaterades: 2016-01-27
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