Till startsida
University of Gothenburg
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Publications

Below we display the major publications from our researchers.

Forthcoming

Hartman, Robert J. (Forthcoming) The Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck, co-edited with Ian M. Church (New York: Routledge).

Hartman, Robert J. (forthcoming) "Accepting Moral Luck," in Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck (New York: Routledge).

Hartman, Robert J. (forthcoming) "Review of Rik Peels' Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology" Ethics.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (forthcoming) "Review of Derk Pereboom's Free will, agency and meaning in life" Utilitas.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (forthcoming) "Accountability, answerability and attributability: On different kinds of moral responsibility" Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom (eds.), Oxford University Press.

Matheson, Benjamin. (forthcoming) "The Threat From Manipulation Arguments", American Philosophical Quarterly

Mickelson, Kristin. (forthcoming) "(In)compatibilism", A Compananion to Free Will, Joseph Campbell (ed.), LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Russell, Paul. (forthcoming) "Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich's Third Way", in Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. G. Caruso, ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Russell, Paul. (forthcoming) "Moral Responsibility and Metaphysical Attitudes". In Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom, eds., Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.

Szigeti, András. (forthcoming) Special Issue of Synthese ‘Thinking (About) Groups’, editor, with John Andrew Michael and Alessandro Salice.

2017

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2017) "Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility", in Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland (eds.). Responsibility - the Epistemic Condition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Björnsson, Gunnar and Brülde, Bengt. (2017) "Normative Responsibilities: Structure and Sources", in Kristien Hens, Dorothee Horstkötter and Daniela Cutas (eds.) Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics. Dordrecht: Springer. Pp. 13-33.

Hartman, Robert J. (2017) In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory (New York: Routledge)

Hartman, Robert J. (2017) "Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism," Journal of Philosophical Research 42, Pp. 301-312.

Milam, Per-Erik. (2017) "How Is Self-Forgiveness Possible?", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly vol. 98, Issue 1. Pp. 49-69.

Russell, Paul. (2017) "Free Will Pessimism". Lecture given to the Vitterhetsakademien/The Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities. Vitterhetsakademien Annual Year Book for 2017. Pp. 47-63

Russell, Paul. (2017) "Free Will Pessimism". In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 4, edited by David Shoemaker. Oxford University Press. Pp. 93-120.

Russell, Paul. (2017) The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays, (New York: Oxford University Press)

Russell, Paul. (2017) Review of "Conversation and Responsibility" by Michael McKenna. Philosophical Review, 126.2, Pp. 285-95.

2016

Björnsson, Gunnar and Hess, Kendy. (2016) "Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research pp. n/a-n/a

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2016) "Outsourcing the Deep Self: Deep Self Discordance Does Not Explain Away Intuitions in Manipulation Arguments" Philosophical Psychology. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1150448

Björnsson, Gunnar and Pereboom, Derk. (2016) "Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility", in Justin Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter (eds.) Companion to Experimental Philosophy (Chichester: Blackwell). pp. 142-157.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016) "Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do otherwise", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(5): pp. 1225-1240

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016) "Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism", Philosophia vol. 44. Issue 3. pp. 793-808

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016) "Accountability, Answerability and Freedom", Social Theory and Practice 42(4): pp.681-705

Matheson, Benjamin. (2016) "In Defence of the Four-Case Argument", Philosophical Studies 173 (7): pp. 1963-1982

Mickelson, Kristin. (2016) "The Manipulation Argument", in Meghan Griffith, Neal Levy, Kevin Timpe, eds. The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Pp. 166-178.

Milam, Per-Erik. (2016) "Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46.1: pp. 102-122

Russell, Paul. (2016) "Free Will and Moral Sentiments: Strawsonian Theories" in The Routledge Companion to Free Will. M. Griffith, N. Levy and K. Timpe (eds.), (New York: Routledge: 2016), pp. 96-108.

2015

Russell, Paul. (2015) - "’Hume’s Lengthy Digression’: Free Will in the Treatise", invited contribution to Hume’s Treatise: A Critical Guide, A. Butler & D. Ainslie, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2015), 230-51.

Szigeti, András. (2015) "Review of Michael Bratman's Shared Agency", Journal of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18: pp. 1101-1104.

Szigeti, András. (2015) "Is Collective Mental Action Possible?", Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6: pp. 843-864.

Szigeti, András. (2015) "Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas", Dialectica 69: pp. 1-22.

Page Manager: Andreas Ott|Last update: 11/10/2017
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